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MYTHS AND RITUALS: A GENERAL THEORY

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NINETEENTH century students strongly tended to study mythology apart from associated rituals (and indeed apart from the life of the people generally). Myths were held to be symbolic descriptions of phenomena of nature.² One prominent school, in fact, tried to find an astral basis for all mythic tales. Others, among whom Andrew Lang was prominent, saw in the myth a kind of primitive scientific theory. Mythology answered the insistent human how? and why? How and why was the world made? How and why were living creatures brought into being? Why, if there was life must there be death? To early psychoanalysts such as Abraham³ and Rank⁴ myths were "group phantasies," wish-fulfillments for a society strictly analogous to the dream and day-dream of individuals. Mythology for these psychoanalysts was also a symbolic structure par excellence, but the symbolism which required interpretation was primarily a sex symbolism which was postulated as universal and all-pervasive. Reik⁵ recognized a connection between rite and myth, and he, with Freud,⁶ verbally agreed to

¹ Based upon a paper read at the Symposium of the American Folklore Society at Chicago in December, 1939. My thanks are due to W. W. Hill, Florence Kluckhohn, A. H. Leighton, Arthur Nock, E. C. Parsons, and Alfred Tozzer for a critical reading and a number of suggestions, to Ruth Underhill and David Mandelbaum for supplying unpublished material on the Papago and Toda respectively.

² Professor Nock has called my attention to the fact that the naturalistic theory actually works very well for the Vedic material.

³ See *Traum und Mythos* (Vienna, 1909). Rank's final conclusion was that "myths are relics from the infantile mental life of the people, and dreams constitute the myths of the individual" (*Selected Papers of Karl Abraham*, London, 1927, p. 32). Cf. also *Traum und Mythos*, pp. 69, 71.

⁴ See Otto Rank, *Psychoanalytische Beiträge zur Mythenforschung* (Vienna and Leipzig, 1919) and *Der Mythos von der Geburt des Helden* (2nd edition, Leipzig and Vienna, 1922). Rank attempts to show that hero myths originate in the delusional structures of paranoiacs.

⁵ Theodor Reik, *Das Ritual* (Leipzig, Vienna, Zurich, 1928).

⁶ Cf. Freud's statement in his introduction to Reik, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

Robertson Smith's proposition that mythology was mainly a description of ritual. To the psychoanalysts, however, mythology was essentially (so far as what they did with it is concerned) societal phantasy material which reflected impulse repression.⁷ There was no attempt to discover the practical function of mythology in the daily behaviors of the members of a society⁸ nor to demonstrate specific interactions of mythology and ceremonials. The interest was in supposedly pan-human symbolic meanings, not in the relation of a given myth or part of a myth to particular cultural forms or specific social situations.⁹

To some extent the answer to the whole question of the relationship between myth and ceremony depends, of course, upon how wide or how restricted a sense one gives to "mythology." In ordinary usage the Oedipus tale is a "myth," but only some Freudians believe that this is merely the description of a ritual! The famous stories of the Republic are certainly called "*μῦθος*," and while a few scholars¹⁰ believe that Plato in some cases had reference to the Orphic and/or Eleusinian mysteries there is certainly not a shred of evidence that all of Plato's immortal "myths" are "descriptions of rituals." To be sure, one may justifiably narrow the problem by saying that in a technical sense these are "legends," and by insisting that "myths" be rigorously distinguished from "legends," "fairy-

⁷ Many psychoanalysts today consider myths simply "a form of collective day-dreaming." I have heard a prominent psychoanalyst say "Creation myths are for culture what early memories (true or fictitious) are to the individual."

⁸ This has been done, even by anthropologists, only quite recently. Boas, as early as 1916 (*Tsimshian Mythology*, Bureau of American Ethnology, Annual Report for 1909-10, vol. 31, pp. 29-1037), did attempt to show how the origin of all folklore must be sought in imaginings based upon the ordinary social life of the society in question. But in this (as in his later publication on the Kwakiutl) he showed how mythology reflected social organization — not how mythology preserved social equilibrium or symbolized social organization.

⁹ Dr. Benedict in her *Zuni Mythology* (New York, 1935) follows a form of explanation which draws heavily from psychoanalytic interpretations. Thus, (p. xix) in discussing the compensatory functions of mythology, she speaks of "folkloristic day-dreaming." But her treatment lacks the most objectionable features of the older psychoanalytic contributions because she does not deal in universalistic, pan-symbolic "meanings" but rather orients her whole presentation to the richly documented Zuni materials and to the specific context of Zuni culture.

¹⁰ Cf. e.g., R. H. S. Crossman, *Plato Today* (London, 1937), p. 88.

tales," and "folk-tales." If, however, one agrees that "myth" has Durkheim's connotation of the "sacred" as opposed to the "profane" the line is still sometimes hard to draw in concrete cases. What of "creation myths"? In some cases (as at Zuni) these are indeed recited¹¹ during ritual performances (with variations for various ceremonies). In other cases, even though they may be recited in a "ritual" attitude, they do not enter into any ceremonial. Nevertheless, they definitely retain the flavor of "the sacred." Moreover, there are (as again at Zuni) exoteric and esoteric forms of the same myth. Among the Navaho many of the older men who are not ceremonial practitioners know that part of a myth which tells of the exploits of the hero or heroes but not the portion which prescribes the ritual details of the chant. Granting that there are sometimes both secular and sacred versions of the same tale and that other difficulties obtrude themselves in particular cases, it still seems possible to use the connotation of the sacred as that which differentiates "myth" from the rest of folklore.¹² At least, such a distinction appears workable to a rough first approximation and will be followed throughout this paper.

But defining "myth" strictly as "sacred tale" does not

¹¹ There are Aranda, Fijian, and Winnebago chants which are almost purely recitals of an origin myth.

¹² This covers the differentia which is often suggested: namely, that myth is distinguished from legend or folktale by the circumstance that some (or perhaps most) of the actors in a myth must be supernatural beings — not simply human beings of however great a legendary stature. There are, of course, other distinctions which could — for other purposes — profitably be entered into. Thus, Professor Nock has suggested to me that there are differences of some consequence between an oral mythology and a written theology. "A true myth," he says, "never takes form with an eye to the pen or to the printed page."

These refinements are undoubtedly interesting and important, but they do not seem directly relevant to the issues dealt with in this paper. Here only the major contrast of sacred and profane appears crucial. Any segregation of myth from folktale, legend, fairytale, etc. which rests upon hair-splitting or upon special premises must be avoided. Thus Roheim's recent stimulating discussion (*Myth and Folk-Tale, American Imago*, vol. 2, 1941, pp. 266-279) is acceptable only insofar as one grants the major postulates of orthodox Freudian psychoanalysis. Roheim says: "A folktale is a narrative with a happy end, a myth is a tragedy; a god must die before he can be truly divine" (p. 276). "In the folk tale we relate how we overcome the anxiety connected with the 'bad parents' and grew up, in myth we confess that only death can end the tragic ambivalence of human nature. Eros triumphs in the folk-tale, Thanatos in the myth" (p. 279).

carry with it by implication a warrant for considering mythology purely as a description of correlative rituals. Rose¹³ quite correctly says "among myths there are many whose connection with any rite is a thing to be proved, not assumed." What is needed is a detailed comparative analysis of actual associations. Generally speaking, we do seem to find rich ritualism and a rich mythology together. But there are cases (like the Toda)¹⁴ where an extensive ceremonialism does not appear to have its equally extensive mythological counterpart and instances (like classical Greece) where a ramified mythology appears to have existed more or less independent of a comparatively meagre rite-system.¹⁵ For example, in spite of the many myths relating to Ares the rituals connected with Ares seem to have been few in number and highly localized in time and space.¹⁶ The early Romans, on the other hand, seemed to get along very well without mythology. The poverty of the ritual which accompanies the extremely complex mythology of the Mohave is well known.¹⁷ Kroeber indeed says "Public ceremonies or rituals as they occur among almost all native Americans cannot be said to be practised by the Mohave."¹⁸

¹³ H. J. Rose, Review of "The Labyrinth" (*Man*, vol. 36, 1936, no. 87, p. 69).

¹⁴ Dr. Mandelbaum writes me: "For the Todas do not have complex myths; myth episodes which take hours and days in the telling among Kotas, are told by Todas in less than three minutes." Cf. M. Emeneau, *The Songs of the Todas* (Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, vol. 77, 1937, pp. 543-560); "... the art of story-telling is almost non-existent. In fact, imaginative story-telling hardly exists and the stories of traditional events in the life of the tribe do not seem to be popular. . . . Some of the songs are based on legendary stories, but even in the case of these some of my informants knew the songs without knowing the stories" (p. 543).

¹⁵ I am thinking here of public (non-cultist) mythology and of official and public ritual. Orphic ritual may have been more closely connected to the complicated Orphic myth. Cf. W. K. C. Guthrie, *Who Were the Orphics?* (*Scientia*, vol. 67, 1937, pp. 110-121), esp. pp. 119-120.

¹⁶ Cf. L. R. Farnell, *The Cults of the Greek States*, vol. IV (Oxford, 1909), pp. 396-407.

¹⁷ A. L. Kroeber, *Handbook of the Indians of California* (Washington, 1925), p. 660.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 755. The Mohave are, of course, also a classic case where myths, at least according to cultural theory, are dreamed. But even though we recognize the cultural patterning of the "dreaming" this in no sense justifies the inference that the myths are derived from the meagre rituals. Indeed Kroeber points out (p. 770) that some myths are not sung to — i.e. are not even ritualized to the extent of being connected with song recitals.

The Bushmen likewise had many myths and very little ritual. On the other hand, one can point to examples like the Central Eskimo, where every detail of the Sedna myth has its ritual analogue in confessional, other rites, or hunting tabus, or, for contrast, to the American Indian tribes (especially some Californian ones) where the creation myth is never enacted in ceremonial form. In different sectors of one culture, the Papago, all of these possibilities are represented. Some myths are never ceremonially enacted. Some ceremonies emphasize content foreign to the myth. Other ceremonies consisting only of songs have some vague place in the mythological world; between these and the myths "there is a certain tenuous connection which may be a rationalization made for the sake of unity. . . ." ¹⁹

The anthropology of the past generation has tended to recoil sharply from any sort of generalized interpretation. Obsessed with the complexity of the historical experience of all peoples, anthropologists have (perhaps over-much) eschewed the inference of regularities of psychological reaction which would transcend the facts of diffusion and of contacts of groups. Emphasis has been laid upon the distribution of myths and upon the mythological patterning which prevailed in different cultures and culture areas. Study of these distributions has led to a generalization of another order which is the converse of the hypothesis of most nineteenth century classical scholars ²⁰ that a ritual was an enactment of a myth. In the words of Boas: ²¹ "The uniformity of many such rituals over large areas and the diversity of mythological explanations show clearly that the ritual itself is the stimulus for the origin of the myth. . . . The ritual existed, and the tale originated from the desire to account for it."

¹⁹ Personal communication from Dr. Ruth Underhill.

²⁰ Certain contemporary classical scholars take a point of view which is very similar to that adopted in this paper. Thus H. J. Rose (*Modern Methods in Classical Mythology*, St. Andrews, 1930, p. 12) says ". . . I postulate . . . a reciprocal influence of myth and ceremony. . . ." Cf. also L. R. Farnell, *The Value and the Methods of Mythologic Study* (London, 1919), p. 11, ". . . occasionally myth is the prior fact that generates a certain ritual, as for instance the offering of horses to St. George in Silesia was suggested by the myth of St. George the horseman. . . ."

²¹ F. Boas and others, *General Anthropology* (New York, 1938), p. 617.

While this suggestion of the primacy of ritual over myth is probably a valid statistical induction and a proper statement of the modal tendency of our evidence, it is, it seems to me, as objectionably a simple unitary explanation (if pressed too far) as the generally rejected nineteenth century views. Thus we find Hocart²² recently asking: "If there are myths that give rise to ritual where do these myths come from?" A number of instances will shortly be presented in which the evidence is unequivocal that myths did give rise to ritual. May I only remark here that — if we view the matter objectively — the Christian Mass, as interpreted by Christians, is a clear illustration of a ritual based upon a sacred story. Surely, in any case, Hocart's question can be answered very simply: from a dream or a waking phantasy or a personal habit system of some individual in the society. The basic psychological mechanisms involved would seem not dissimilar to those whereby individuals in our own (and other) cultures construct private rituals²³ or carry out private divination²⁴ — e.g. counting and guessing before the clock strikes, trying to get to a given point (a traffic light, for instance) before something else happens. As DuBois²⁵ has suggested, "the explanation may be that personal rituals have been taken over and socialized by the group." These "personal rituals" could have their genesis in idiosyncratic habit²⁶ formations (similar to those of obsessional neurotics in our culture) or in dreams or reveries. Mrs. Seligman²⁷ has con-

²² A. M. Hocart, *Myth and Ritual* (*Man*, vol. 36, no. 230), p. 167.

²³ Cf. A. M. Tozzer, *Social Origins and Social Continuities* (New York, 1934), pp. 242-267, esp. p. 260 ff.

²⁴ R. R. Willoughby gives good examples and discussions of these culturally unformalized divinatory practices. See *Magic and Cognate Phenomena: An Hypothesis* (In: *A Handbook of Social Psychology*, Carl Murchison, ed., Worcester, Mass., 1935, pp. 461-520), pp. 480-482.

²⁵ C. DuBois, *Some Anthropological Perspectives on Psychoanalysis* (*Psychoanalytic Review*, vol. 24, 1937, pp. 246-264), p. 254.

²⁶ In other words, in terms of patterns of behavior which are distinctive of an individual, not as a representative of a particular cultural tradition, but as a differentiated biological organism who — either because of inherited constitutional differences or because of accidents of the conditioning process — behaves differently in major respects from most individuals of the same age, sex, and status acculturated in the same culture.

²⁷ B. Z. Seligman, *The Part of the Unconscious in Social Heritage* (In: *Essays Presented to C. G. Seligman*, London, 1934, pp. 307-319).

vincingly suggested that spontaneous personal dissociation is a frequent mechanism for rite innovations. The literature is replete with instances of persons "dreaming" that supernaturals summoned them, conducted them on travels or adventures, and finally admonished them thereafter to carry out certain rites (often symbolically repetitive of the adventures).

Moreover, there are a number of well documented actual cases where historical persons, in the memory of other historical persons, actually instituted new rituals. The ritual innovations of the American Indian Ghost Dance cult²⁸ and other nativistic cults of the New World²⁹ provide striking illustration. In these cases the dreams or phantasies — told by the innovators before the ceremonial was ever actualized in deeds — became an important part of traditionally accepted rite-myths. Lincoln³⁰ has presented plausible evidence that dreams are the source of "new" rituals. Morgan,³¹ on the basis of Navaho material, says:

. . . delusions and dreams . . . are so vivid and carry such conviction that any attempt to reason about them afterwards on the basis of conscious sense impressions is unavailing. Such experiences deeply condition the individual, sometimes so deeply that if the experience is at variance with a tribal or neighborhood belief, the individual will retain his own variation. There can be no doubt that this is a very significant means of modifying a culture.

Van Gennep³² asserts that persons went to dream in the sanctuary at Epidaurus as a source for new rites in the cult of Asclepius. To obtain ceremony through dream is, of course, itself a pattern, a proper traditional way of obtaining a ceremony or power. I do not know of any cases of a society where dreaming

²⁸ I am, of course, well aware that the rites of the Ghost Dance were not by any means identical in all tribes. But in spite of wide variations under the influence of pre-existent ideal and behavioral patterns *certain* new ritual practices which must be connected with the visions of the founder may be found in almost every tribe.

²⁹ See A. F. Chamberlain, *New Religions among the North American Indians* (*Journal of Religious Psychology*, 1913, vol. 6, pp. 1-40).

³⁰ J. S. Lincoln, *The Dream in Primitive Cultures* (Baltimore, 1935).

³¹ William Morgan, *Human Wolves Among the Navaho* (Yale University Publications in Anthropology, No. 11, 1936), p. 40. Dr. Henry A. Murray of the Harvard Psychological Clinic informs me that there is clinical evidence that an individual can be conditioned (in the technical psychological sense) by a dream.

³² A. van Gennep, *La Formation des Légendes* (Paris, 1910), p. 255. The peyote cult is, of course, an outstanding case where dreams determine variation in ritual.

is generally in disrepute, as at Zuni, and where ceremony has yet demonstrably originated through dream. But where dreaming is accepted as revelation it must not be assumed that the content (or even, entirely, the structure) of a new myth and its derived ceremony will be altogether determined by pre-existent cultural forms. As Lowie³³ has remarked, "That they themselves (dreams) in part reflect the regnant folklore offers no ultimate explanation." Anthropologists must be wary of what Korzybski calls "self-reflexive systems" — here, specifically, the covert premise that "culture alone determines culture."

The structure of new cultural forms (whether myths or rituals) will undoubtedly be conditioned by the pre-existent cultural matrix. But the rise of new cultural forms will almost always be determined by factors external to that culture: pressure from other societies, biological events such as epidemics, or changes in the physical environment. Barber³⁴ has recently shown how the Ghost Dance and the Peyote Cult represent alternative responses of various American Indian tribes to the deprivation resultant upon the encroachment of whites. The Ghost Dance was an adaptive response under the earlier external conditions, but under later conditions the Peyote Cult was the more adaptive response, and the Ghost Dance suffered what the stimulus-response psychologists would call "extinction through non-reward." At any rate the Ghost Dance became extinct in some tribes; in others it has perhaps suffered only partial extinction.

There are always individuals in every society who have their private rituals; there are always individuals who dream and who have compensatory phantasies. In the normal course of things these are simply deviant behaviors which are ridiculed or ignored by most members of the society. Perhaps indeed one should not speak of them as "deviant" — they are "deviant" only as carried to extremes by a relatively small number of individuals, for everyone probably has some

³³ R. H. Lowie, *The History of Ethnological Theory* (N. Y., 1937), p. 264.

³⁴ Bernard Barber, *Acculturation and Messianic Movements* (*American Sociological Review*, vol. 6, 1941, pp. 663-670); *A Socio-Cultural Interpretation of the Peyote Cult* (*American Anthropologist*, 1941, vol. 43, pp. 673-676).

private rituals and compensatory phantasies. When, however, changed conditions happen to make a particular type of obsessive behavior or a special sort of phantasy generally congenial, the private ritual is then socialized by the group, the phantasy of the individual becomes the myth of his society. Indeed there is evidence³⁵ that when pressures are peculiarly strong and peculiarly general, a considerable number of different individuals may almost simultaneously develop substantially identical phantasies which then become widely current.

Whether belief (myth) or behavior (ritual) changes first will depend, again, both upon cultural tradition and upon external circumstances. Taking a very broad view of the matter, it does seem that behavioral patterns more frequently alter first. In a rapidly changing culture such as our own many ideal patterns are as much as a generation behind the corresponding behavioral patterns. There is evidence that certain ideal patterns (for example, those defining the status of women) are slowly being altered to harmonize with, to act as rationalizations for, the behavioral actualities. On the other hand, the case of Nazi Germany is an excellent illustration of the ideal patterns ("the myth") being provided from above almost whole cloth and of the state, through various organizations, exerting all its force to make the behavioral patterns conform to the standards of conduct laid down in the Nazi mythology.

Some cultures and sub-cultures are relatively indifferent to belief, others to behavior. The dominant practice of the Christian Church, throughout long periods of its history, was to give an emphasis to belief which is most unusual as seen from a cross-cultural perspective. In general, the crucial test as to whether or not one was a Christian was the willingness to avow belief in certain dogmas.³⁶ The term "believer" was almost synonymous with "Christian." It is very possibly because of this cultural screen that until this century most European scholars selected the myth as primary.

³⁵ See Marie Bonaparte, *Princess of Greece, The Myth of the Corpse in the Car* (The American Imago, 1941, vol. 2, pp. 105-127).

³⁶ Ruth Benedict in the Article "Myth" (Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, vol. IX, 1939) makes a similar point but distorts it by the implication that belief in a certain *cosmology* was the single crucial test of Christianity.

II

To a considerable degree, the whole question of the primacy of ceremonial or mythology is as meaningless as all questions of "the hen or the egg" form. What is really important, as Malinowski has so brilliantly shown, is the intricate interdependence of myth (which is one form of ideology) with ritual and many other forms of behavior. I am quite aware that I have little to add conceptually to Malinowski's discussion in "The Myth in Primitive Psychology."³⁷ There he examines myths not as *curiosa* taken out of their total context but as living, vitally important elements in the day to day lives of his Trobrianders, interwoven with every other abstracted type of activity. From this point of view one sees the fallacy of all unilateral explanations. One also sees the aspect of truth in all (or nearly all) of them. There are features which seem to be explanatory of natural phenomena.³⁸ There are features which reveal the peculiar forms of wish fulfillments characteristic of the culture in question (including the expression of the culturally disallowed but unconsciously wanted). There *are* myths which are intimately related to rituals, which may be descriptive of them, but there are other myths which stand apart. If these others are descriptive of rituals at all, they are, as Durkheim (followed by Radcliffe-Brown and others) suggested, descriptions of rituals of the social organization. That is, they are symbolic representations of the dominant configurations³⁹ of the particular culture. Myths, then, may ex-

³⁷ London, 1926.

³⁸ Radcliffe-Brown's explanation, though useful, strikes me as too narrow in that it seems to deny to nonliterate man *all* bare curiosity and any free play of fancy, undetermined by societal necessities. He says (Andaman Islanders, Cambridge, England, 1933, pp. 380-381): "Natural phenomena such as the alternation of day and night, the changes of the moon, the procession of the seasons, and variations of the weather, have important effects on the welfare of the society . . . a process of bringing within the circle of the social life those aspects of nature that are of importance to the well-being of the society."

³⁹ "Configuration" is here used as a technical term referring to a structural regularity of the covert culture. In other words, a configuration is a principle which structures widely varying contexts of culture content but of which the culture carriers are minimally aware. By "configuration" I mean something fairly similar to what some authors have meant by "latent culture pattern" as distinguished from "manifest

press not only the latent content of rituals but of other culturally organized behaviors. Malinowski is surely in error when he writes⁴⁰ "... myth . . . is not symbolic. . . ." Durkheim and Mauss⁴¹ have pointed out how various non-literate groups (notably the Zuni and certain tribes of southeastern Australia) embrace nature within the schema of their social organization through myths which classify natural phenomena precisely according to the principles that prevail in the social organization. Warner⁴² has further developed this type of interpretation.

Boas,⁴³ with his usual caution, is sceptical of all attempts to find a systematic interpretation of mythology. But, while we can agree with him when he writes "... mythological narratives and mythological concepts should not be equalized; for social, psychological, and historical conditions affect both in different ways,"⁴⁴ the need for scrupulous inquiry into historical and other determinants must not be perverted to justify a repudiation of all attempts to deal with the symbolic processes of the all-important covert culture. At all events, the factual record is perfectly straightforward in one respect: neither myth nor ritual can be postulated as "primary."

This is the important point in our discussion at this juncture, and it is unfortunate that Hooke and his associates in their otherwise very illuminating contributions to the study of the relations between myth and ritual in the Near East have emphasized only one aspect of the system of interdependences which Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown have shown to exist. When Hooke⁴⁵ points out that myths are constantly used to

culture pattern." The concept is also closely akin to what Sumner and Keller call a cultural "ethos." For a fuller discussion of "configuration" and "covert culture" see Clyde Kluckhohn, *Patterning as Exemplified in Navaho Culture* (In: *Language, Culture, and Personality*, L. Spier, ed., Menasha, 1941, pp. 109-131), esp. pp. 109, 124-129.

⁴⁰ Op. cit., p. 19.

⁴¹ *De Quelques formes primitives de classification* (*L'Année Sociologique*, vol. 6).

⁴² W. L. Warner, *A Black Civilization* (New York, 1937), esp. pp. 371-411.

⁴³ See especially F. Boas, Review of G. W. Locher, "The Serpent in Kwakiutl Religion: a Study in Primitive Culture" (*Deutsche Literaturzeitung*, 1933, pp. 1182-1186; reprinted in *Race, Language, and Culture*, New York, 1940, pp. 446-450).

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 450.

⁴⁵ S. H. Hooke, *The Origins of Early Semitic Ritual* (London, 1938), pp. 2, 3, 8. See also *Myth and Ritual* (London, 1935).

justify rituals this observation is quite congruent with the observed facts in many cultures. Indeed all of these data may be used toward a still wider induction: man, as a symbol-using animal, appears to feel the need not only to act but almost equally to give verbal or other symbolic "reasons" for his acts.⁴⁶ Hooke⁴⁷ rightly speaks of "the vital significance of the myth as something that works," but when he continues "and that dies apart from its ritual" he seems to imply that myths cannot exist apart from rituals and this, as has been shown, is contrary to documented cases. No, the central theorem has been expressed much more adequately by Radcliffe-Brown:⁴⁸ "In the case of both ritual and myth the sentiments expressed are those that are essential to the existence of the society." This theorem can be regarded as having been well established in a general way, but we still lack detailed observations on change in myths as correlated with changes in ritual and changes in a culture generally.⁴⁹ Navaho material gives certain hints that when a culture as a whole changes rapidly its myths are also substantially and quickly altered.

In sum, the facts do not permit any universal generalizations as to ritual being the "cause" of myth or vice versa. Their relationship is rather that of intricate mutual interdependence, differently structured in different cultures and probably at different times in the same culture. As Benedict⁵⁰ has pointed out, there is great variation in the extent to which mythology conditions the religious complex — "the small role of myth in Africa and its much greater importance in religion in parts of North America." Both myth and ritual satisfy the needs of a

⁴⁶ This statement is not to be interpreted as credence in "the aetiological myth" if by this one means that a myth "satisfies curiosity." We are not justified, I believe, in *completely* excluding the aetiological (in this sense) motive in every case, but Whitehead's statement (*Religion in the Making*, New York, 1926) probably conforms to a rough induction: "Thus the myth not only explains but reinforces the hidden purpose of the ritual which is emotion" (p. 25).

⁴⁷ S. H. Hooke (ed.) *The Labyrinth* (New York, 1935), p. ix.

⁴⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 405.

⁴⁹ The best documentation of the fact that myths are constantly undergoing revision is probably to be found in various writings of Boas. See, for example, *Race, Language, and Culture* (New York, 1940), pp. 397-525, *passim*.

⁵⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 180.

society and the relative place of one or the other will depend upon the particular needs (conscious and unconscious) of the individuals in a particular society at a particular time. This principle covers the observed data which show that rituals are borrowed without their myths,⁵¹ and myths without any accompanying ritual. A ritual may be reinforced by a myth (or vice versa) in the donor culture but satisfy the carriers of the recipient culture simply as a form of activity (or be rationalized by a quite different myth which better meets their emotional needs).⁵² In short, the only uniformity which can be posited is that there is a strong tendency for some sort of interrelationship between myth and ceremony and that this interrelationship is dependent upon what appears, so far as present information goes, to be an invariant function of both myth and ritual: the gratification (most often in the negative form of anxiety reduction) of a large proportion of the individuals in a society.

If Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown (and their followers) turned the searchlight of their interpretations as illuminatingly upon specific human animals and their impulses as upon cultural and social abstractions, it might be possible to take their work as providing a fairly complete and adequate general theory of myth and ritual. With Malinowski's notion of myth as "an active force" which is intimately related to almost every other

⁵¹ This appears to be the Papago case. (Underhill, personal communication.)

⁵² There are many striking and highly specific parallels between Navaho and Hopi ceremonial practices. For example, the mechanical equipment used in connection with the Sun's House phase of the Navaho Shooting Way chants has so much in common with similar gadgets used in Hopi ceremonials that one can hardly fail to posit a connection. Dr. Parsons has documented the intimate resemblances between the Male Shooting Way chant and Hopi Flute and Snake-Antelope ceremonies (A Pre-Spanish Record of Hopi Ceremonies; *American Anthropologist*, 1940, vol. 42, pp. 541-543, fn. 4, p. 541). The best guess at present would be that the Hopi was the donor culture, but the direction of diffusion is immaterial here: the significant point is that the supporting myths in the cases concerned show little likeness. For instance, Dr. Parsons regards the Flute Ceremony as a dramatization of the Hopi emergence myth, but the comparable ritual acts in Navaho culture are linked to chantway legends of the usual Holy Way pattern and not to the emergence story. In contrast, the White Mountain Apache seem to have borrowed *both* Snake myth and ritual from the Hopi. See E. C. Parsons, *Pueblo Indian Religion* (Chicago, 1939), p. 1060 and G. Goodwin, *Myths and Tales of the White Mountain Apache* (Memoirs of the American Folklore Society, vol. 33, New York, 1939), p. vii.

aspect of a culture we can only agree. When he writes:⁵³ "Myth is a constant by-product of living faith which is in need of miracles; of sociological status, which demands precedent; of moral rule which requires sanction," we can only applaud. To the French sociologists, to Radcliffe-Brown, and to Warner we are indebted for the clear formulation of the symbolic principle. Those realms of behavior and of experience which man finds beyond rational and technological control he feels are capable of manipulation through symbols.⁵⁴ Both myth and ritual are symbolical procedures and are most closely tied together by this, as well as by other, facts. The myth is a system of word symbols, whereas ritual is a system of object and act symbols. Both are symbolic processes for dealing with the same type of situation in the same affective mode.

But the French sociologists, Radcliffe-Brown, and — to a lesser extent — Malinowski are so interested in formulating the relations between conceptual elements that they tend to lose sight of the concrete human organisms. The "functionalists" do usually start with a description of some particular ritualistic behaviors. Not only, however, do the historical origins of this particular behavioral complex fail to interest them. Equally, the motivations and rewards which persons feel are lost sight of in the preoccupation with the contributions which the rituals make to the social system. Thus a sense of the specific detail is lost and we are soon talking about myth in general and ritual in general. From the "functionalist" point of view specific details are about as arbitrary as the phonemes of a language are with respect to "the content" of what is communicated by speech. Hence, as Dollard⁵⁵ says, "What one sees from the cultural angle is a drama of life much like a puppet show in which 'culture' is pulling the strings from behind the scenes." The realization that we are really dealing with "animals struggling in real dilemmas" is lacking.

From this angle, some recent psychoanalytic interpretations

⁵³ *Op. cit.*, p. 92.

⁵⁴ That is, forms of behavior whose value or meaning is assigned by human beings — not inherent in the intrinsic properties of the words or acts.

⁵⁵ John Dollard, *Culture, Society, Impulse, and Socialization* (*American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 45, pp. 50-64), p. 52.

of myth and ritual seem preferable. We may regard as unconvincing Roheim's⁵⁶ attempts to treat myths as historical documents which link human phylogenetic and ontogenetic development, as we may justly feel that many psychoanalytic discussions of the latent content of mythology are extravagant and undisciplined. Casey's⁵⁷ summary of the psychoanalytic view of religion "... ritual is a sublimated compulsion; dogma and myth are sublimated obsessions" may well strike us as an over-simplified, over-neat generalization, but at least our attention is drawn to the connection between cultural forms and impulse-motivated organisms. And Kardiner's⁵⁸ relatively sober and controlled treatment does "point at individuals, at bodies, and at a rich and turbulent biological life" — even though that life is admittedly conditioned by social heredity: social organization, culturally defined symbolic systems, and the like.

In a later section of this paper, we shall return to the problem of how myths and rituals reinforce the behavior of individuals. But first let us test the generalities which have been propounded thus far by concrete data from a single culture, the Navaho.⁵⁹

III

The Navaho certainly have sacred tales which, as yet at all events, are not used to justify associated rituals. A striking case, and one where the tale has a clear function as expressing a sentiment "essential to the existence of the society," is known from different parts of the Navaho country.⁶⁰ The tales

⁵⁶ G. Roheim, *The Riddle of the Sphinx* (London, 1934), esp. pp. 173-174.

⁵⁷ R. P. Casey, *The Psychoanalytic Study of Religion* (*Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, vol. 33, 1938, pp. 437-453), p. 449.

⁵⁸ A. Kardiner, *The Individual and His Society* (New York, 1939), esp. pp. 182-194, 268-270.

⁵⁹ Some Navaho material has, of course, already been presented. See pp. 47, 51, 57, *supra*.

⁶⁰ E. L. Hewett (*The Chaco Canyon and Its Monuments*, Albuquerque, 1936, p. 139) records the dissemination of this tale among the Chaco Canyon Navaho. Drs. A. and D. Leighton and I have obtained independent evidence that the same story was told, and believed by many, among the Ramah Navaho (two hundred odd miles away) at the same time. Those who believed the tale carried out ceremonials but not new ceremonials. Rather the old ceremonials (especially Blessing Way rites) were carried out in unusual frequency. In 1936 in the Huerfano country a young woman reported that she had been visited by White Shell Woman who had been given instructions for

differ in detail but all have these structural elements in common: one of "the Holy People" visits one or more Navahos to warn them of an impending catastrophe (a flood or the like) which will destroy the whites — but believing Navahos will be saved if they retire to the top of a mountain or some other sanctuary. It is surely not without meaning that these tales became current at about the time that the Navahos were first feeling intensive and sustained pressure (they were not just prisoners of war as in the Fort Sumner epoch) from the agents of our culture.⁶¹

Father Berard Haile⁶² has recently published evidence that

Blessing Ways to be held — but with special additional procedures. These rites were widely carried out in the northeastern portion of the Navaho area. (See article by Will Evans in the Farmington, N. M., Times Hustler, under date-line of February 21, 1937.) Also in 1936 a woman in the Farmington region claimed to have been visited by Banded Rock Boy (one of the Holy People) and a similar story spread over the Reservation. A famous singer, Left-handed, refused to credit the tale and many Navahos attributed his death (which occurred soon thereafter) to his disbelief. See Mesa Verde Notes, March, 1937, vol. 7, pp. 16-19. F. Gilmor (Windsinger, New York, 1930) has used a story of the same pattern, obtained from the Navaho of the Kayenta, Arizona region as a central episode in a novel.

⁶¹ Jane Harrison (Themis, Cambridge, England, 1912) says: "It is this collective sanction and solemn purpose that differentiate the myth alike from the historical narrative and the mere *conte* or fairy-tale . . ." (p. 330), and many agreeing with her will doubtless assert that my argument here is invalid because these tales though unquestionably having "solemn purpose" lack "collective sanction." Some would also contend that since living persons claim to have seen the supernatural beings these stories must be called "tales" or, at any rate, not "myths." I see these points and, since I wish to avoid a purely verbal quarrel, I would agree, so far as present data go, that Navaho myths (in the narrow sense) are uniformly associated with ritual behaviors. Actually, *the* myth which most Navaho call their most sacred (the emergence story) is associated with rites only in a manner which is, from certain points of view, tenuous. The emergence myth is not held to be the basis for any single ceremonial, nor is it used to justify any very considerable portion of ceremonial practice. The emergence myth (or some part of it) is often prefaced to the chantway legend proper. In any case, I must insist (granting always that the line between secular and sacred folk literature must not be drawn too sharply) that the stories dealt with above are not part of the "profane" folklore of the Navaho in the sense in which the Coyote tales, for example, are. The origin legends of the various clans are certainly not secular literature, but I imagine that a purist would maintain that we must call these "legends" as lacking "solemn purpose" (in Harrison's sense). Nevertheless I repeat that "myths" in the broad sense of "sacred tale" are, among the Navaho, found quite dissociated from ritual.

⁶² A Note on the Navaho Visionary (American Anthropologist, vol. 42, 1940, p. 359). This contains still another reference to the flood motif.

Navaho ceremonials may originate in dreams or visions rather than being invariably post hoc justifications for existent ritual practices. A practitioner called "son of the late Black Goat" instituted a new ceremonial "which he had learned in a dream while sleeping in a cave." Various informants assured Father Berard that chantway legends originated in the "visions" of individuals.⁶³ We have, then, Navaho data for (a) the existence of myths without associated rituals, (b) the origin of both legends and rituals in dreams or visions.

It is true that all ceremonial practice among the Navaho is, in cultural theory, justified by an accompanying myth. One may say with Dr. Parsons⁶⁴ on the Pueblos: "Whatever the original relationship between myth and ceremony, once made, the myth supports the ceremony or ceremonial office and may suggest ritual increments." One must in the same breath, however, call attention to the fact that myth also supports accepted ways of secular behavior. As Dr. Hill⁶⁵ has pointed out, "Women are required to sit with their legs under them and to one side, men with their legs crossed in front of them, because it is said that in the beginning Changing Woman and the Monster Slayer sat in these positions." Let this one example suffice for the many which could easily be given.⁶⁶ The general point is that in both sacred and secular spheres myths give some fixity to the ideal patterns of cultures where this is not attained by the printed word. The existence of rituals has a similar effect.

⁶³ The assertion that ceremonials sometimes have their genesis in dreams and the like does not imply that this, any more than that between myth and ritual, is a one-way relationship. One can by no means dispose of the matter simply by saying "dreams cause myths and myths cause ceremonies." William Morgan (Navaho Dreams, *American Anthropologist*, vol. 34, 1932, pp. 390-406), who was also convinced that some Navaho myths derive from dreams (p. 395), has pointed out the other aspect of the interdependence: "... myths ... influence dreams; and these dreams, in turn, help to maintain the efficacy of the ceremonies. ... Repetitive dreams do much to strengthen the traditional beliefs concerning dreams" (p. 400).

⁶⁴ E. C. Parsons, *Pueblo Indian Religion* (Chicago, 1939), p. 968, footnote.

⁶⁵ W. W. Hill, *The Agricultural and Hunting Methods of the Navaho Indians* (New Haven, 1938), p. 179.

⁶⁶ Dr. Parsons has suggested (personal communication) an analogue from our own culture: "It was argued that because Eve was made from Adam's rib women should not have the vote."

Although I cannot agree with Wissler⁶⁷ that "the primary function" of rituals is "to perpetuate exact knowledge and to secure precision in their application," there can be no doubt that both myths and rituals are important agencies in the transmission of a culture and that they act as brakes upon the speed of culture change.

Returning to the connections between myth and rite among the Navaho, one cannot do better than begin by quoting some sentences from Washington Matthews:⁶⁸ "In some cases a Navajo rite has only one myth pertaining to it. In other cases it has many myths. The relation of the myth to the ceremony is variable. Sometimes it explains nearly everything in the ceremony and gives an account of all the important acts from beginning to end, in the order in which they occur; at other times it describes the work in a less systematic manner. . . . Some of the myths seem to tell only of the way in which rites, already established with other tribes, were introduced among the Navajos. . . . The rite-myth never explains all of the symbolism of the rite, although it may account for all the important acts. A primitive and underlying symbolism which probably existed previous to the establishment of the rite, remains unexplained by the myth, as though its existence were taken as a matter of course, and required no explanation."

To these observations one may add the fact that knowledge of the myth is in no way prerequisite to carrying out of a chant. Knowledge does give the singer or curer prestige and ability to expect higher fees, and disparaging remarks are often heard to the effect "Oh, he doesn't know the story," or "He doesn't know the story very well yet." And yet treatment by a practitioner ignorant of the myth⁶⁹ is regarded as efficacious.

⁶⁷ C. Wissler, *The Function of Primitive Ritualistic Ceremonies* (Popular Science Monthly, vol. 87, pp. 200-204), p. 203.

⁶⁸ Washington Matthews, *Some Illustrations of the Connection between Myth and Ceremony* (International Congress of Anthropology, Memoirs, Chicago, 1894, pp. 246-251), p. 246.

⁶⁹ How much a practitioner knows of both legend and ceremonial depends upon the demands he made upon his instructor during his apprenticeship. The instructor is not supposed to prompt his pupil. Many practitioners are satisfied with quite mechanical performances, and there is no doubt that much information (both legendary and ritualistic) is being lost at present owing to the fact that apprentices do not question their instructors more than superficially.

Navahos are often a little cynical about the variation in the myths. If someone observes that one singer did not carry out a procedure exactly as did another (of perhaps greater repute) it will often be said "Well, he says *his* story is different." Different forms of a rite-myth tend to prevail in different areas of the Navaho country and in different localities. Here the significance of the "personality" of various singers may sometimes be detected in the rise of variations. The transvestite ⁷⁰ "Left-handed" who died a few years ago enjoyed a tremendous reputation as a singer. There is some evidence ⁷¹ that he restructured a number of myths as he told them to his apprentices in a way which tended to make the hermaphrodite *be?gočidí* a kind of supreme Navaho deity — a position which he perhaps never held in the general tradition up to that point.⁷² I have heard other Navaho singers say that sandpaintings and other ceremonial acts and procedures were slightly revised to accord with this tenet. If this be true, we have here another clear case of myth-before-ritual.

Instances of the reverse sort are also well documented. From a number of informants accounts have been independently obtained of the creation (less than a hundred years ago) of a new rite: Enemy Monster Blessing Way. All the information agreed that the ritual procedures had been devised by one man who collated parts of two previously existent ceremonials and added a few bits from his own fancy. And three informants independently volunteered the observation "He didn't have any story. But after a while he and his son and another fellow made one up."⁷³ This is corroborated by the fact that none of Father Berard's numerous versions of the Blessing Way myth mention an Enemy Monster form.⁷⁴

Besides these notes on the relations between myth and rite

⁷⁰ A transvestite is an individual who assumes the garb of the other sex. Transvestites are often, but apparently not always, homosexuals.

⁷¹ See W. W. Hill, *The Status of the Hermaphrodite and Transvestite in Navaho Culture* (*American Anthropologist*, vol. 37, 1935, pp. 273-280), p. 279.

⁷² For a hint, however, that *be?gočidí* was so considered at an earlier time, see W. Matthews, *Navaho Legends* (New York, 1897), p. 226, footnote 78.

⁷³ Cf. Clyde Kluckhohn and Leland C. Wyman, *An Introduction to Navaho Chant Practice* (*Memoir 53*, American Anthropological Association, 1940), pp. 186-187.

⁷⁴ Personal communication.

I should like to record my impression of another function of myth — one which ranges from simple entertainment to “intellectual edification.” Myth among the Navaho not only acts as a justification, a rationale for ritual behavior and as a moral reinforcement for other customary behaviors. It also plays a role not dissimilar to that of literature (especially sacred literature) in many literate cultures. Navahos have a keen expectation of the long recitals of myths (or portions of them) around the fire on winter nights.⁷⁵ Myths have all the charm of the familiar. Their very familiarity increases their efficacy, for, in a certain broad and loose sense, the function of both myths and rituals is “the discharge of the emotion of individuals in socially accepted channels.” And Hocart⁷⁶ acutely observes: “Emotion is assisted by the repetition of words that have acquired a strong emotional coloring, and this coloring again is intensified by repetition.” Myths are expective, repetitive dramatizations — their role is similar to that of books in cultures which have few books. They have the (to us) scarcely understandable meaningfulness which the tragedies had for the Greek populace. As Matthew Arnold said of these, “their significance appeared inexhaustible.”

IV

The inadequacy of any simplistic statement of the relationship between myth and ritual has been established. It has likewise been maintained that the most adequate generalization will not be cast in terms of the primacy of one or the other of these cultural forms but rather in terms of the general tendency

⁷⁵ Why may the myths be recited only in winter? In Navaho feeling today this prohibition is linked in a wider configuration of forbidden activities. There is also, as usual, an historical and distributional problem, for this same prohibition is apparently widely distributed in North America. For example, it is found among the Berens River Salteaux (see A. I. Hallowell, *Fear and Anxiety as Cultural and Individual Variables in a Primitive Society*, *Journal of Social Psychology*, vol. 9, 1938, pp. 25-48, p. 31) and among the Iroquois (Dr. William Fenton: personal conversation). But I wonder if in a certain “deeper” sense this prohibition is not founded upon the circumstance that only winter affords the leisure for telling myths, that telling them in summer would be unfitting because it would interfere with work activities?

⁷⁶ A. M. Hocart, *Ritual and Emotion (Character and Personality)*, vol. 7, 1939, pp. 201-211, p. 208.

for the two to be interdependent. This generalization has been arrived at through induction from abstractions at the cultural level. That is, as we have sampled the evidence from various cultures we have found cases where myths have justified rituals and have appeared to be "after the fact" of ritual; we have also seen cases where new myths have given rise to new rituals. In other words, the primary conclusion which may be drawn from the data is that myths and rituals tend to be very intimately associated and to influence each other. What is the explanation of the observed connection?

The explanation is to be found in the circumstance that myth and ritual satisfy a group of identical or closely related needs of individuals. Thus far we have alluded only occasionally and often obliquely to myths and rituals as cultural forms defining individual behaviors which are adaptive or adjustive⁷⁷ responses. We have seen how myths and rituals are adaptive from the point of view of the society in that they promote social solidarity, enhance the integration of the society by providing a formalized statement of its ultimate value-attitudes, afford a means for the transmission of much of the culture with little loss of content — thus protecting cultural continuity and stabilizing the society. But how are myth and ritual rewarding enough in the daily lives of individuals so that individuals are instigated to preserve them, so that myth and ritual continue to prevail at the expense of more rational responses?

A systematic examination of this question, mainly again in terms of Navaho material, will help us to understand the prevailing interdependence of myth and ritual which has been documented. This sketch of a general theory of myth and ritual as providing a cultural storehouse of adjustive responses for individuals is to be regarded as tentative from the writer's point of view. I do not claim that the theory is proven — even in the context of Navaho culture. I do suggest that it provides a series of working hypotheses which can be tested by specifically pointed field procedures.

⁷⁷ This useful distinction I owe to my colleague, Dr. Hobart Mowrer. "Adaptation" is a purely descriptive term referring to the fact that certain types of behavior result in survival. "Adjustment" refers to those responses which remove the motivation stimulating the individual. Thus suicide is adjustive but not adaptive.

We can profitably begin by recurring to the function of myth as fulfilling the expectancy of the familiar. Both myth and ritual here provide cultural solutions to problems which all human beings face. Burke has remarked, "Human beings build their cultures, nervously loquacious, upon the edge of an abyss." In the face of want and death and destruction all humans have a fundamental insecurity.⁷⁸ To some extent, all culture is a gigantic effort to mask this, to give the future the simulacrum of safety by making activity repetitive, expective — "to make the future predictable by making it conform to the past." From one angle our own scientific mythology is clearly related to that motivation as is the obsessive, the compulsive tendency which lurks in all organized thought.

When questioned as to why a particular ceremonial activity is carried out in a particular way, Navaho singers will most often say "because the *diyin diné* — the Holy People — did it that way in the first place." The *ultima ratio* of non-literates⁷⁹ strongly tends to be "that is what our fathers said it was." An Eskimo said to Rasmussen:⁸⁰ "We Eskimos do not concern ourselves with solving all riddles. We repeat the old stories in the way they were told to us and with the words we ourselves remember." The Eskimo saying "we keep the old rules in order that we may live untroubled" is well-known. The Navaho and Eskimo thus implicitly recognize a principle which has been expressed by Harvey Ferguson⁸¹ as follows:

... man dreads both spontaneity and change, . . . he is a worshipper of habit in all its forms. Conventions and institutions are merely organized and more or less sanctified habits. These are the real gods of human society, which transcend and outlive all other gods. All of them originate as group expedients which have some social value at some time, but they remain the objects of a passionate adoration long after they have outlived their usefulness. Men fight and die for them. They have their high priests, their martyrs, and their rituals. They are the working gods, whatever the ostensible ones may be.

⁷⁸ Cf. Malinowski (op. cit., p. 78): "They would screen with the vivid texture of their myths, stories, and beliefs about the spirit world, the vast emotional void gaping beyond them."

⁷⁹ There is, to be sure, at least a rough parallel in our own culture in "the Bible says so" and similar phrases.

⁸⁰ Knud Rasmussen, *Intellectual Culture of the Hudson Bay Eskimos* (Copenhagen, 1938), p. 69.

⁸¹ *Modern Man* (New York, 1936), p. 29.

These principles apply as well to standardized overt acts as to standardized forms of words. Thus Pareto considered the prevalence of ritual in all human cultures as perhaps the outstanding empirical justification for his thesis of the importance of non-logical action. Merton⁸² writes:

... activities originally conceived as instrumental are transmuted into ends in themselves. The original purposes are forgotten and ritualistic adherence to institutionally prescribed conduct becomes virtually obsessive. . . . Such ritualism may be associated with a mythology which rationalizes these actions so that they appear to retain their status as means, but the dominant pressure is in the direction of strict ritualistic conformity, irrespective of such rationalizations. In this sense ritual has proceeded farthest when such rationalizations are not even called forth.

Goldstein,⁸³ a neurologist, recognizes a neurological basis for the persistence of such habit systems and writes: "The organism tends to function in the accustomed manner, as long as an at least moderately effective performance can be achieved in this way."

Nevertheless, certain objections to the position as thus far developed must be anticipated and met. It must be allowed at once that the proposition "man dreads both spontaneity and change" must be qualified. More precisely put, we may say "most men, most of the time, dread both spontaneity and change in most of their activities." This formulation allows for the observed fact that most of us *occasionally* get irked with the routines of our lives or that there are certain sectors of our behavior where we fairly consistently show spontaneity. But a careful examination of the totality of behavior of any individual who is not confined in an institution or who has not withdrawn almost completely from participation in the society will show that the larger proportion of the behavior of even the greatest iconoclasts is habitual. This must be so, for by very definition a socialized organism is an organism which behaves mainly in a predictable manner. Even in a culture like contemporary American culture which has made an institutionalized value of change (both for the individual and for society), conformity

⁸² R. K. Merton, *Social Structure and Anomie* (*American Sociological Review*, vol. 3, 1938, pp. 672-683), p. 673.

⁸³ Kurt Goldstein, *The Organism* (New York, 1939), p. 57.

is at the same time a great virtue. To some extent, this is phrased as conformity with the latest fashion, but Americans remain, by and large, even greater conformists than most Europeans.

Existence in an organized society would be unthinkable unless most people, most of the time, behaved in an expectable manner. Rituals constitute a guarantee that in certain socially organized behaviors touching upon certain "areas of ignorance" which constitute "tender spots" for all human beings, people can count upon the repetitive nature of the phenomena. For example, in Zuni society (where rituals are highly calendrical) a man whose wife has left him or whose crops have been ruined by a torrential downpour can yet look forward to the Shalako ceremonial as something which is fixed and immutable. Similarly, the personal sorrow of the devout Christian is in some measure mitigated by anticipation of the great feasts of Christmas and Easter. Perhaps the even turn of the week with its Sunday services and mid-week prayer meetings gave a dependable regularity which the Christian clung to even more in disaster and sorrow. For some individuals daily prayer and the confessional gave the needed sense of security. Myths, likewise, give men "something to hold to." The Christian can better face the seemingly capricious reverses of his plans when he hears the joyous words "lift up your hearts." Rituals and myths supply, then, fixed points in a world of bewildering change and disappointment.

If almost all behavior has something of the habitual about it, how is it that myths and rituals tend to represent the maximum of fixity? Because they deal with those sectors of experience which do not seem amenable to rational control and hence where human beings can least tolerate insecurity. That very insistence upon the minutiae of ritual performance, upon preserving the myth to the very letter, which is characteristic of religious behavior must be regarded as a "reaction formation" (in the Freudian sense) which compensates for the actual intransigence of those events which religion tries to control.

To anticipate another objection: do these "sanctified habit systems" show such extraordinary persistence simply because

they are repeated so often and so scrupulously? Do myths and rituals constitute repetitive behavior par excellence not merely as reaction formations but because the habits are practiced so insistently? Perhaps myths and rituals endure in accord with Allport's "principle of functional autonomy"⁸⁴ — as interpreted by some writers? No, performances must be rewarded in the day to day lives of participating individuals. Sheer repetition in and of itself has never assured the persistence of any habit. If this were not so, no myths and rituals would ever have become extinct except when a whole society died out. It is necessary for us to recognize the somewhat special conditions of drive and of reward which apply to myths and rituals.

It is easy to understand why organisms eat. It is easy to understand why a defenceless man will run to escape a charging tiger. The physiological bases of the activities represented by myths and rituals are less obvious. A recent statement by a stimulus-response psychologist gives us the clue:⁸⁵ "The position here taken is that human beings (and also other living organisms to varying degrees) can be motivated either by organic pressures (needs) that are currently felt *or* by the mere anticipation of such pressures and that those habits tend to be acquired and perpetuated (reinforced) which effect a reduction in either of these two types of motivation." That is, myths and rituals are reinforced because they reduce the anticipation of disaster. No living person has died — but he has seen others die. The terrible things which we have seen happen to others may not yet have plagued us, but our experience teaches us that these are at least potential threats to our own health or happiness.

If a Navaho gets a bad case of snow-blindness and recovers after being sung over, his disposition to go to a singer in the event of a recurrence will be strongly reinforced. And, by the

⁸⁴ As a matter of fact, Allport has made it plain (*Motivation in Personality: Reply to Mr. Bertocci, Psychological Review, 1940, vol. 47, pp. 533-555*) that he contends only that motives may be autonomous in respect to their origins but never in respect to the satisfaction of the ego (p. 547).

⁸⁵ O. H. Mowrer, *A Stimulus-Response Analysis of Anxiety and its Role as a Reinforcing Agent (Psychological Review, vol. 46, 1939, pp. 553-566)*, p. 561.

principle of generalization, he is likely to go even if the ailment is quite different. Likewise, the reinforcement will be reciprocal — the singer's confidence in his powers will also be reinforced. Finally, there will be some reinforcement for spectators and for all who hear of the recovery. That the ritual treatment rather than more rational preventatives or cures tends to be followed on future occasions can be understood in terms of the principle of the gradient of reinforcement. Delayed rewards are less effective than immediate rewards. In terms of the conceptual picture of experience with which the surrogates of his culture have furnished him, the patient *expects* to be relieved. Therefore, the very onset of the chant produces some lessening of emotional tension — in technical terms, some reduction of anxiety. If the Navaho is treated by a white physician, the "cure" is more gradual and is dependent upon the purely physico-chemical effects of the treatment. If the native wears snow goggles or practices some other form of prevention recommended by a white, the connection between the behavior and the reward (no soreness of the eyes) is so diffuse and so separated in time that reinforcement is relatively weak. Even in those cases where no improvement (other than "psychological") is effected, the realization or at any rate the final acceptance that no help was obtained comes so much later than the immediate sense of benefit⁸⁶ that the extinction effects are relatively slight.⁸⁷

Navaho myths and rituals provide a cultural storehouse of adjustive⁸⁸ responses for individuals. Nor are these limited to

⁸⁶ I have attended hundreds of Navaho ceremonials and I have never yet seen a case where the patient at some point, at least, during the ceremonial did not profess to feel an improvement. This applies even to cases where the patient was actually dying.

⁸⁷ The theory of this paragraph has been stated in the language of contemporary stimulus-response psychology. But it is interesting to note that E. S. Hartland (*Ritual and Belief*, New York) expressed essentially the same content in 1916: "Recurrence of the emotional stress would tend to be accompanied by repetition of the acts in which the reaction has been previously expressed. If the recurrence were sufficiently frequent, the form of the reaction would become a habit to be repeated on similar occasions, even where the stress was less vivid or almost absent. It can hardly be doubted that many rites owe their existence to such reactions" (pp. 116-117).

⁸⁸ It is not possible to say adaptive here because there are not infrequent occasions on which ceremonial treatment aggravates the condition or actually brings about death (which would probably not have supervened under a more rational treatment or even

the more obvious functions of providing individuals with the possibility of enhancing personal prestige through display of memory, histrionic ability, etc. Of the ten "mechanisms of defence" which Anna Freud⁸⁹ suggests that the ego has available, their myths and rituals afford the Navaho with institutionalized means of employing at least four. Reaction-formation has already been briefly discussed. Myths supply abundant materials for introjection and likewise (in the form of witchcraft myths) suggest an easy and culturally acceptable method of projection of hostile impulses. Finally, rituals provide ways of sublimation of aggression and other socially disapproved tendencies, in part, simply through giving people something to *do*.

All of these "mechanisms of ego defence" will come into context only if we answer the question "adjustive with respect to what?" The existence of motivation, of "anxiety" in Navaho individuals must be accounted for by a number of different factors. In the first place — as in every society — there are those components of "anxiety," those "threats" which may be understood in terms of the "reality principle" of psychoanalysis: life *is* hard — an unseasonable temperature, a vagary of the rainfall does bring hunger or actual starvation; people *are* organically ill. In the second place, there are various forms of "neurotic" anxiety. To some extent, every society tends to have a type anxiety. In our own society it is probably sexual, although this may be true only of those segments of our society who are able to purchase economic and physical security. In most Plains Indians sexual anxiety, so far as we can tell from the available documents, was insignificant. There the basic anxiety was for life itself and for a certain quality of that life (which I cannot attempt to characterize in a few words).

if the patient had simply been allowed to rest). From the point of view of the society, however, the rituals are with little doubt adaptive. Careful samples in two areas and more impressionistic data from the Navaho country generally indicate that the frequency of ceremonials has very materially increased concomitantly with the increase of white pressure in recent years. It is tempting to regard this as an adaptive response similar to that of the Ghost Dance and Peyote Cult on the part of other American Indian tribes.

⁸⁹ Anna Freud, *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence* (London, 1937).

Among the Navaho the "type anxiety" is certainly that for health. Almost all Navaho ceremonials (essentially every ceremonial still carried out today) are curing ceremonials. And this apparently has a realistic basis. A prominent officer of the Indian Medical Service stated that it was his impression that morbidity among the Navaho is about three times that found in average white communities. In a period of four months' field work among the Navaho Drs. A. and D. Leighton found in their running field notes a total of 707 Navaho references to "threats" which they classified under six headings.⁹⁰ Of these, sixty per cent referred to bodily welfare, and are broken down by the Leightons as follows:

Disease is responsible for sixty-seven per cent, accidents for seventeen per cent, and the rest are attributed to wars and fights. Of the diseases described, eighty-one per cent were evidently organic, like smallpox, broken legs, colds, and sore throats; sixteen per cent left us in doubt as to whether they were organic or functional; and three per cent were apparently functional, with symptoms suggesting depression, hysteria, etc. Of all the diseases, forty per cent were incapacitating, forty-three per cent were not, and seventeen per cent were not sufficiently specified in our notes to judge. From these figures it can easily be seen that lack of health is a very important concern of these Navahos, and that almost half of the instances of disease that they mentioned interfered with life activities.

While I am inclined to believe that the character of this sample was somewhat influenced by the fact that the Leightons were white physicians — to whom organic illnesses, primarily, would be reported — there is no doubt that these data confirm the reality of the health "threat." In terms of clothing and shelter which are inadequate (from our point of view at least), of hygiene and diet which similarly fail to conform to our health standards, it is not altogether surprising that the Navaho need to be preoccupied with their health.⁹¹ It is unequivocally true in my experience that a greater proportion of my Navaho friends are found ill when I call upon them than of my white friends.

⁹⁰ See A. H. and D. C. Leighton, *Some Types of Uncasiness and Fear in a Navaho Indian Community* (to appear in the *American Anthropologist*, April, 1942).

⁹¹ It remains amazing that their population could have increased at such an extraordinary rate if health conditions have been so poor. Dr. A. Leighton suggests to me that it is conceivable that when the land was less crowded their health was better.

The Navaho and Pueblo Indians live in essentially the same physical environment. But Pueblo rituals are concerned predominantly with rain and with fertility. This contrast to the Navaho preoccupation with disease cannot (in the absence of fuller supporting facts) be laid to a lesser frequency of illness among the Pueblos, for it seems well documented that the Pueblos, living in congested towns, have been far more ravaged by endemic diseases than the Navaho. The explanation is probably to be sought in terms of the differing historical experience of the two peoples and in terms of the contrasting economic and social organizations. If one is living in relative isolation and if one is largely dependent (as were the Navaho at no terribly distant date) upon one's ability to move about hunting and collecting, ill health presents a danger much more crucial than to the Indian who lives in a town which has a reserve supply of corn and a more specialized social organization.

That Navaho myths and rituals are focussed upon health and upon curing has, then, a firm basis in the reality of the external world. But there is also a great deal of uneasiness arising from inter-personal relationships, and this undoubtedly influences the way the Navaho react to their illnesses. Then, too, one type of anxiousness always tends to modify others. Indeed, in view of what the psychoanalysts have taught us about "accidents" and of what we are learning from psychosomatic medicine about the psychogenic origin of many "organic" diseases we cannot regard the sources of disease among the Navaho as a closed question.⁹²

Where people live under constant threat from the physical environment, where small groups are geographically isolated and "emotional inbreeding" within the extended family group is at a maximum, inter-personal tensions and hostilities are inevitably intense. The prevalence of ill health which throws additional burdens on the well and strong is in itself an additional socially disrupting force.⁹³ But if the overt expression

⁹² It does not seem implausible that some disorders (especially perhaps those associated with acute anxieties) are examples of what Caner has called "superstitious self-protection." See G. C. Caner, *Superstitious Self-Protection* (*Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry*, 1940, vol. 44, pp. 351-361).

⁹³ Dr. A. Leighton has pointed out to me that these disruptive tendencies are re-

of aggressive impulses proceeds very far the whole system of "economic" co-operation breaks down and then sheer physical survival is more than precarious. Here myths and rituals constitute a series of highly adaptive responses from the point of view of the society. Recital of or reference to the myths reaffirms the solidarity of the Navaho sentiment system.⁹⁴ In the words of a Navaho informant: "Knowing a good story will protect your home and children and property. A myth is just like a big stone foundation — it lasts a long time." Performance of rituals likewise heightens awareness of the common system of sentiments. The ceremonials also bring individuals together in a situation where quarrelling is forbidden. Preparation for and carrying out of a chant demands intricately ramified co-operation, economic and otherwise, and doubtless thus reinforces the sense of mutual dependency.

Myths and rituals equally facilitate the adjustment of the individual to his society. Primarily, perhaps, they provide a means of sublimation of his anti-social tendencies. It is surely not without meaning that essentially all known chant myths take the family and some trouble within it as a point of departure. Let us look at Reichard's⁹⁵ generalization of the chant myth:

A number of chant legends are now available and all show approximately the same construction. People are having a hard time to secure *subsistence* or have some grievance. A boy of the family is forbidden to go somewhere or to do some particular thing. He does not observe the warnings and does that

inforced by one of the techniques for survival which those Navahos who have intimate and competitive relations with whites have developed. He writes: "A group threatened by a stronger group can swing to one of two poles. (a) They can coalesce and form a highly efficient, highly integrated unit that can act with swiftness, power, and precision, and in which all individuals stand or fall together. (b) They can disperse like a covey of quail so as never to present a united target to the foe. This is the Navaho method of dealing with the whites. It is every man for himself, and though individuals may fall, enough escape to survive. You don't rush to help your tribesman when trouble comes, you stay out of it, you 'let it go.' Such an attitude, however, does lead to mutual mistrust."

⁹⁴ Cf. Radcliffe-Brown (op. cit., p. 330): "... tales that might seem merely the products of a somewhat childish fancy are very far indeed from being merely fanciful and are the means by which the Andamanese express and systematize their fundamental notions of life and nature and the sentiments attaching to those notions."

⁹⁵ Gladys Reichard, *Navajo Medicine Man* (New York, 1939), p. 76. Italics mine.

which was forbidden, whereupon he embarks upon a series of adventures which keep him away from home so long that *his family despairs of his return*. . . . After the dramatic episodes, the hero returns to his home bringing with him the ritualistic lore which he teaches to *his brother*. He has been away so long and has become so accustomed to association with deity that *his own people seem impure* to him. He corrects that fault by teaching them the means of purification. . . . He has *his brother* conduct the ritual over *his sister* . . . he vanishes into the air.

While as a total explanation the following would be over-simple, it seems fair to say that the gist of this may be interpreted as follows: the chant myth supplies a catharsis for the traumata incident upon the socialization of the Navaho child. That brother and sister are the principal *dramatis personae* fits neatly with the central conflicts of the Navaho socialization process. This is a subject which I hope to treat in detail in a later paper.

Overt quarrels between family members are by no means infrequent, and, especially when drinking has been going on, physical blows are often exchanged. Abundant data indicate that Navahos have a sense of shame⁹⁶ which is fairly persistent and that this is closely connected with the socially disapproved hostile impulses which they have experienced toward relatives. It is also clear that their mistrust of others (including those in their own extended family group) is in part based upon a fear of retaliation (and this fear of retaliation is soundly based upon experience in actual life as well as, possibly, upon "unconscious guilt"). Certain passages in the myths indicate that the Navaho have a somewhat conscious realization that the ceremonials act as a cure, not only for physical illness, but also for anti-social tendencies. The following extract from the myth of the Mountain Top Way Chant will serve as an example: "The ceremony cured Dsililyi Neyani of all his strange

⁹⁶ This is significantly reflected in ceremonial lore. Torlino, a singer of Beauty Way, said to Washington Matthews: "I am ashamed before the earth; I am ashamed before the heavens; I am ashamed before the dawn; I am ashamed before the evening twilight; I am ashamed before the blue sky; I am ashamed before the sun; *I am ashamed before that standing within me which speaks with me (my conscience)*. Some of these things are always looking at me. I am never out of sight." Washington Matthews, *Navaho Legends* (American Folklore Society, Memoirs, 5, 1897), pp. 58-59. Italics are mine.

feelings and notions. The lodge of his people no longer smelled unpleasant to him."⁹⁷

Thus "the working gods" of the Navaho are their sanctified repetitive ways of behavior. If these are offended by violation of the culture's system of scruples, the ceremonials exist as institutionalized means of restoring the individual to full rapport with the universe: nature and his own society.⁹⁸ Indeed "restore" is the best English translation of the Navaho word which the Navaho constantly use to express what the ceremonial does for the "patient." The associated myths reinforce the patient's belief that the ceremonial will both truly cure him of his illness and also "change" him so that he will be a better man in his relations with his family and his neighbors. An English-speaking Navaho who had just returned from jail where he had been put for beating his wife and molesting his stepdaughter said to me: "I am sure going to behave from now on. I am going to be changed — just like somebody who has been sung over."

Since a certain minimum of social efficiency is by derivation a biological necessity for the Navaho, not all of the hostility and uneasiness engendered by the rigors of the physical environment, geographical isolation, and the burdens imposed by illness is expressed or even gets into consciousness. There is a great deal of repression and this leads, on the one hand, to projection phenomena (especially in the form of phantasies that others are practicing witchcraft against one⁹⁹) and, on the other hand, the strong feelings of shame at the conscious level are matched by powerful feelings of guilt at the unconscious level. Because a person feels guilty by reason of his unconscious hostilities toward members of his family (and friends and neighbors generally), some individuals develop chronic anxie-

⁹⁷ W. Matthews, *The Mountain Chant* (Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology, vol. 5, Washington, 1887, pp. 379-467), p. 417.

⁹⁸ Cf. A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, *Taboo* (Cambridge, England, 1939), p. 44. "The primary value of ritual . . . is the attribution of ritual value to objects and occasions which are either themselves objects of important common interests linking together the persons of a community or are symbolically representative of such objects."

⁹⁹ This view is developed with full documentation in a forthcoming publication to be issued by the Peabody Museum of Harvard University in the spring of 1942.

tics. Such persons feel continually uncomfortable. They say they "feel sick all over" without specifying organic ailments other than very vaguely. They feel so "ill" that they must have ceremonials to cure them. The diagnostician and other practitioners, taking myths as their authority, will refer the cause of the illness to the patient's having seen animals struck by lightning, to a past failure to observe ritual requirements or to some similar violation of a cultural scruple. But isn't this perhaps basically a substitution of symbols acceptable to consciousness, a displacement of guilt feelings?

It is my observation that Navahos other than those who exhibit chronic or acute anxieties tend characteristically to show a high level of anxiety. It would be a mistake, however, to attribute all of this anxiety to intra-familial tensions, although it is my impression that this is the outstanding pressure. Secondary drives resultant upon culture change and upon white pressure are also of undoubted importance. And it is likewise true, as Mr. Homans¹⁰⁰ has recently pointed out, that the existence of these ritual injunctions and prohibitions (and of the concomitant myths and other beliefs) gives rise to still another variety of anxiety which Homans has well called secondary anxiety. In other words, the conceptual picture of the world which Navaho culture sets forth makes for a high threshold of anxiety in that it defines all manner of situation as fraught with peril, and individuals are instigated to anticipate danger on every hand.

But the culture, of course, prescribes not only the supernatural dangers but also the supernatural means of meeting these dangers or of alleviating their effects. Myths and rituals jointly provide systematic protection against supernatural dangers, the threats of ill health and of the physical environment, anti-social tensions, and the pressures of a more powerful society. In the absence of a codified law and of an authoritarian "chief" or other father substitute, it is only through the myth-ritual system that Navahos can make a socially supported, unified response to all of these disintegrating threats.

¹⁰⁰ G. C. Homans, *Anxiety and Ritual* (American Anthropologist, vol. 45, 1941), pp. 164-173.

The all-pervasive configurations of word symbols (myths) and of act symbols (rituals) preserve the cohesion of the society and sustain the individual, protecting him from intolerable conflict. As Hoagland ¹⁰¹ has recently remarked:

Religion appears to me to be a culmination of this basic tendency of organisms to react in a configurational way to situations. We must resolve conflicts and disturbing puzzles by closing some sort of a configuration, and the religious urge appears to be a primitive tendency, possessing biological survival value, to unify our environment so that we can cope with it.

V

The Navaho are only one case.¹⁰² The specific adaptive and adjustive responses performed by myth and ritual will be differently phrased in different societies according to the historical experience of these societies (including the specific opportunities they have had for borrowing from other cultures), in accord with prevalent configurations of other aspects of the culture, and with reference to pressures exerted by other societies and by the physical and biological environment. But the general nature of the adaptive and adjustive responses performed by myth and ritual appears very much the same in all human groups. Hence, although the relative importance of myth and of ritual does vary greatly, the two tend universally to be associated.

For myth and ritual have a common psychological basis. Ritual is an obsessive repetitive activity — often a symbolic dramatization of the fundamental “needs” of the society, whether “economic,” “biological,” “social,” or “sexual.” Mythology is the rationalization of these same needs, whether they are all expressed in overt ceremonial or not. Someone has said “every culture has a type conflict and a type solution.”

¹⁰¹ Hudson Hoagland, *Some Comments on Science and Faith* (In: *Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion*, New York, 1941, mimeographed), p. 5.

¹⁰² But I was very much struck in reading Dr. Hallowell's recent article (A. I. Hallowell, *The Social Function of Anxiety in a Primitive Society*, *American Sociological Review*, vol. 6, December, 1941, pp. 869-882) — which I read only when this paper was in proof — at the similarity not only in the interpretations he reached but at that in the data from the Saulteaux, when he says “fear of disease is a major social sanction” (p. 871) that fits the Navaho case precisely — as does “illness due to having done bad things or to transgression of a parent” (p. 873).

Ceremonials tend to portray a symbolic resolvment of the conflicts which external environment, historical experience, and selective distribution of personality types¹⁰³ have caused to be characteristic in the society. Because different conflict situations characterize different societies, the "needs" which are typical in one society may be the "needs" of only deviant individuals in another society. And the institutionalized gratifications (of which rituals and myths are prominent examples) of culturally recognized needs vary greatly from society to society. "Culturally recognized needs" is, of course, an analytical abstraction. Concretely, "needs" arise and exist only in specific individuals. This we must never forget, but it is equally important that myths and rituals, though surviving as functioning aspects of a coherent culture only so long as they meet the "needs" of a number of concrete individuals, are, in one sense, "supra-individual." They are usually composite creations; they normally embody the accretions of many generations, the modifications (through borrowing from other cultures or by intra-cultural changes) which the varying needs of the group as a whole and of innovating individuals in the group have imposed. In short, both myths and rituals are cultural products, part of the social heredity of a society.

¹⁰³ This selective distribution of personality types may become established biologically, through the operation of genetic mechanisms, or through the processes of child socialization operative in the particular culture.

ADDITIONAL ARTICLES OF INTEREST

IN

CULTURES, SOCIETIES, AND AGE-SEX STRUCTURES

- S- 1. Aberle, et al., "The Functional Prerequisites of a Society."
- *S- 4. †Aron, "Social Structure and the Ruling Class."
- S- 17. Bendix, "Industrialization, Ideologies, and Social Structure."
- S- 18. Benedict, "Continuities and Discontinuities in Cultural Conditioning."
- S- 22. Berreman, "Caste in India and the United States."
- S- 25. Bierstedt, "Sociology and Humane Learning."
- S- 26. †Birnbaum, "Conflicting Interpretations of the Rise of Capitalism: Marx and Weber."
- S- 27. Birnbaum, "Monarchs and Sociologists: A Reply to Professor Shils and Mr. Young."
- S- 40. Chinoy, "Social Mobility Trends in the United States."
- S- 47. Coleman, "Social Cleavage and Religious Conflict."
- S- 51. †Coser, "Social Conflict and the Theory of Social Change."
- S- 52. Cottrell, "Roles and Marital Adjustment."
- S- 58. Dahrendorf, "Out of Utopia: Toward a Reorientation of Sociological Analysis."
- S- 64. Davis, "Illegitimacy and the Social Structure."
- S- 66. Davis, "The Origin and Growth of Urbanization in the World."
- S- 67. Davis, "The Sociology of Parent-Youth Conflict."
- S- 68. Davis and Moore, "Some Principles of Stratification," bound with: Tumin, "Some Principles of Stratification: A Critical Analysis."
- S- 70. De Gre, "Freedom and Social Structure."
- S- 75. Duncan and Schnore, "Cultural, Behavioral, and Ecological Perspectives in the Study of Social Organization."
- S- 76. Durkheim, "Some Notes on Occupational Groups."
- S- 77. Du Wors, "The Markets and the Mores: Economics and Sociology."
- S- 78. Eisenstadt, "The Process of Absorption of New Immigrants in Israel."
- S- 79. Elkin and Westley, "The Myth of Adolescent Culture."
- S- 84. Finestone, "Cats, Kicks, and Color."
- S- 88. Freidson, "Communications Research and the Concept of the Mass."
- S- 92. Garfinkel, "Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies."
- S-100. Goode, "The Theoretical Importance of Love."
- *S-101. Gouldner, "Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles."
- S-102. Gouldner, "The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement."
- S-107. Gusfield, "The Problem of Generations in an Organizational Structure."
- S-115. Hawley, "Ecology and Human Ecology."
- S-119. Hollingshead, "Selected Characteristics of Classes in a Middle Western Community."
- S-121. †Homans, "Anxiety and Ritual: The Theories of Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown."
- S-122. Homans, "Social Behavior as Exchange."
- S-125. Hoselitz, "The Role of Cities in the Economic Growth of Underdeveloped Countries."
- S-131. Inkeles, "Industrial Man: The Relation of Status to Experience, Perception, and Value."
- S-132. Inkeles, "Social Stratification and Mobility in the Soviet Union: 1940-1950."
- S-134. Janowitz, "Military Elites and the Study of War."
- S-135. Janowitz, "Some Consequences of Social Mobility in the United States."
- S-138. Kecskemeti, "Totalitarian Communications as a Means of Control: A Note on the Sociology of Propaganda."
- *S-146. †Kluckhohn, "Myths and Rituals: A General Theory."
- S-147. Kluckhohn, "Patterning as Exemplified in Navaho Culture."
- S-150. Komarovskiy, "Cultural Contradictions and Sex Roles."
- S-153. Kroeber, "Kinds and Properties of Styles."
- *S-154. Kroeber, "The Superorganic."
- S-155. Kroeber, "Review of Arnold J. Toynbee's A Study of History."
- S-157. LaBarre, "The Cultural Basis of Emotions and Gestures."
- S-159. Landes, "French Business and the Businessman: A Social and Cultural Analysis."
- S-161. Lasswell, "The Garrison State."
- S-165. †Lee, "Lineal and Nonlinear Codifications of Reality."
- *S-169. Levy, "Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan."
- S-172. Lindesmith and Strauss, "A Critique of Culture-Personality Writings."
- S-173. Linton, "Age and Sex Categories."
- S-183. Malinowski, "The Group and the Individual in Functional Analysis."
- S-184. Marriott, "Western Medicine in a Village of Northern India."
- S-187. Mead, "The Social Self."
- S-188. Mead, "A Behavioristic Account of the Significant Symbol."
- S-189. Meggors, "Environmental Limitation on the Development of Culture."
- S-190. Meier and Bell, "Anomia and Differential Access to the Achievement of Life Goals."
- S-192. Merton, "Puritanism, Pietism, and Science."
- S-194. Merton, "Social Structure and Anomie."
- S-195. Merton, "Sociological Theory."
- S-202. Miner, "The Folk-Urban Continuum."
- S-205. Moore and Tumin, "Some Social Functions of Ignorance."
- S-211. Ogburn, "Cultural Lag as Theory."
- S-212. Ogburn, "Social Trends."
- S-213. Ogburn, "Technology as Environment."
- S-217. Parsons, "Age and Sex in the Social Structure of the United States."
- S-220. Parsons, "The Theoretical Development of the Sociology of Religion: A Chapter in the History of Modern Social Science."
- S-227. Radcliffe-Brown, "On the Concept of Function in Social Science."
- S-229. Redfield, "The Folk Society."
- S-232. Reiss, "Rural-Urban and Status Differences in Interpersonal Contacts."
- S-238. Rogoff, "Social Stratification in France and in the United States."
- *S-240. Rose, "Voluntary Association in France."
- S-246. Sapir, "Fashion."
- S-254. Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation."
- S-256. Selznick, "Institutional Vulnerability in Mass Society."
- S-257. Sewell, "Infant Training and the Personality of the Child."
- S-264. Shils and Young, "The Meaning of the Coronation."
- S-270. Sjoberg, "Folk and 'Feudal' Societies."
- S-271. Sjoberg, "The Preindustrial City."
- S-275. Sorokin and Merton, "Social Time: A Methodological and Functional Analysis."
- S-329. †Spratt, "*Principia Sociologica*."
- S-283. Strodtbeck, "Husband-Wife Interaction Over Revealed Differences."
- S-286. Swanson, "The Approach to a General Theory of Action by Parsons and Shils."
- S-292. †Timasheff, "What is 'Sociology of Law?'"
- S-293. Tumin, "Some Principles of Stratification: A Critical Analysis," bound with: Davis and Moore.
- S-301. Waller, "The Rating and Dating Complex."
- S-302. Warner, "What Social Class is in America."
- *S-303. Warner, "The Study of Social Stratification."
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- S-310. White, "The Definition and Prohibition of Incest."
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- S-320. Wirth, "Urbanism as a Way of Life."
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- S-325. Zborowski, "Cultural Components in Responses to Pain."